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After various state governments tinkered with the negligence liability sys-
tem by altering some of the common law defenses, the legislatures turned
their attention to the more radical reform of introducing workers' com-
pensation. Between 1911 and 1921, forty-three states adopted workers'
compensation laws at the behest of political coalitions combining work-
ers, employers, and insurers. To fully understand what each of these groups
expected to gain from the legislation, it is necessary to examine the changes
wrought by the introduction of workers' compensation. The new laws
raised the average accident benefits paid to workers in workplace acci-
dents. The rise in accident benefits, in turn, led to reductions in the wages
paid by employers, reductions in savings and insurance purchases by
households, and changes in the care taken by employers and workers to
prevent accidents.
The switch to workers' compensation eliminated fault as an issue in de-
termining accident compensation. All workers injured in accidents "aris-
ing out of or in the course of" employment were compensated. The new
compensation rules caused a substantial increase in the percentage of in-
jured workers receiving compensation. Further, the average amount paid
to the families of fatal accident victims jumped several-fold. When consid-
ering both fatal and nonfatal accidents together, the percentages of wages
or payrolls that were paid out in benefits and/or medical expenses to acci-
dent victims rose anywhere from 75 to 200 percent with the introduction
of workers' compensation.
The rise in postaccident payment led many contemporary reformers to
hail workers' compensation as a substantial improvement in workers' wel-
fare, providing them better protection against the financial consequences
of workplace accidents. Many observers anticipated an added benefit that
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employers would take more actions to enhance workplace safety and re-
duce accident rates. The expectations were reasonable, but changes in so-
cial insurance programs often lead to adjustments in labor markets and in
the behavior of workers that have consequences that are contrary to what
reformers anticipate. Therefore, the de facto redistribution of workplace
accident costs associated with the switch to workers' compensation might
have been much smaller than what social reformers presumed.
In this chapter we discuss how the introduction of workers' compen-
sation changed the nature of postaccident benefits in the early twenti-
eth century. We then investigate its impact on wages, household saving
and accident insurance purchases, and fatal accident rates. In the case
of wages, numerous studies of the economic impact of government-man-
dated benefits find that employers are able to pass at least part of their costs
back to workers through reduced wages (see Moore and Viscusi 1990, 24;
Gruber and Krueger 1991; Chelius and Burton 1994; and Gruber 1994).
A close examination of wages in three dangerous industries when workers'
compensation was first introduced suggests that employers were able to
pass some of the costs of workers' compensation on to nonunion workers
through lower wages, but were less successful in passing the costs on to
unionized workers.
Even though many workers may have "bought" the higher benefits asso-
ciated with workers' compensation through lower wages, we argue in this
chapter that they were nonetheless better off as a result of the legislation.
We establish that workers were better insured against workplace accident
risk under workers' compensation than under negligence liability. Using a
large cross-sectional data set of working class households' financial deci-
sions in the period 1917 to 1919, we show that in workers' compensation
states households bought slightly less accident insurance and held sub-
stantially lower precautionary savings, holding everything else constant.
It appears that workers were not able to purchase their desired levels of
accident insurance under negligence liability, in part because insurance
companies faced significant informational problems in selling workplace
accident insurance to individual workers. Instead, many workers were
forced to rely on precautionary savings, which were a relatively expensive
means of insuring against accident risk. The guarantee of accidentbene-
fits from workers' compensation allowed workers to reduce their precau-
tionary saving and, thus, increase their consumption of other goods.
Finally, as long as insurance premiums were experience ratedthat is,
employers with more dangerous workplaces paid higher insurance premi-
umshigher workers' compensation benefits imposed higher costs on em-
ployers. Since workers' compensation insurance was somewhat experience
rated in the early twentieth century, we might anticipate that employers
would seek to create safer workplaces if the expected damages they paid
for accidents were higher than the costs of preventing the accident. On56Chapter 3
the other hand, given that they received higher benefits, workers' costs of
incurring an accident were reduced, which might have led to their taking
less care in preventing accidents or reporting phantom injuries. In this
chapter we cite the results of studies that show that workers' compensation
was associated with a decline in fatal accident rates in manufacturing in-
dustries, but an increase in fatal accident rates in the coal industry. We
speculate that differences in the employers' costs of preventing accidents
across these industries produced this dissimilar effect on fatal accident
rates.
3.1Accident Compensation under Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation laws mandated that employers remunerate all
workers for their injuries arising "out of and in the course of employ-
ment." Accident benefits paid out under workers' compensation were de-
termined by statutory provisions that varied by state and within states
over time. The laws typically provided that injured workers (or the families
of the deceased) were to be paid a percentage of their weekly wage for a
maximum number of weeks, subject to maximum weekly payouts and
some maximum total level of compensation. Variations in state patterns
are discussed in detail in appendix B. In many states the percentage of the
wage replaced varied with respect to the number of family members. In
the discussions below we assume that the worker was married with two
children, ages eight and ten.
The families of workers killed in workplace accidents typically received
benefits under state laws patterned after the New Jersey law of 1911. In
New Jersey employers were expected to offer the widow and children of a
fatal accident victim weekly payments equal to 45 percent of the workers'
wage for up to three hundred weeks. Weekly benefits could not be lower
than $5 a week or higher than $10 a week, and the sum of the payments
could not exceed $3,000 or be lower than $1,500. In addition, New Jersey
offered the family $100 for funeral expenses. Nearly all states focused on
paying the money weekly over an extended period of time. Thus the family
of a New Jersey worker who was earning a national average wage of $14.83
per week in 1911 could expect to receive $6.67 a week for nearly six years.
The present value of this stream of payments using a discount rate of 5
percent was $1,840. This present value reflects how much a family would
have had to invest at 5 percent compounded interest at the time payments
began to generate the stream of weekly workers' compensation payments.
The family would have therefore received a stream of payments with a
present value of about 2.5 times the annual income the worker had been
earning. New Jersey's initial workers' compensation law was substantially
less generous than the laws in Washington, New York, Oregon, West Vir-
ginia, and South Dakota, where the present values of fatality benefits ex-The Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation 57
ceeded five times annual income. Georgia, Vermont, and Virginia adopted
the least generous initial laws with present values of fatality payments that
replaced two years' income.
Workers' compensation laws also established benefit parameters for
nonfatal accidents, which were far more common than fatal accidents.
Nonfatal accidents were separated into three major categories: permanent
total disability (e.g., full paralysis), permanent partial disability (e.g., loss
of a hand), and temporary disability (e.g., broken leg). In most states, the
compensation for nonfatal accidents followed the general pattern of that
for fatal accidents. During his disability the worker was paid a percent-
age of his weekly wage, subject to statutory minimum and maximum pay-
ments, for a maximum number of weeks. Each state established a waiting
period, ranging from three days to two weeks from the date of the acci-
dent, during which time no accident compensation was paid. Injured
workers who were out of work for a period less than the waiting period
received no compensation. The rules for permanent total disability pay-
ments, say for full paralysis, were similar to the rules for fatal accident
payments (without the funeral expense payments) in nearly every state.
The relative generosity of the states varied for different types of acci-
dents. We have combined the present values of the accident payments for
each type of accident into a summary measure of workers' compensation
benefits, the expected benefits. The expected benefits measure takes the
present value of the benefits of each of the broad categories of accidents
and weights each present value with the probability that such an accident
might occur. Rough estimates of the number of manufacturing accidents
per thousand workers each year range from 0.14 permanent total disabili-
ties, 2 fatalities, 10 permanent partial disabilities (loss of a hand, finger, or
eye), to 120 short-term injuries that disabled the worker longer than the
waiting period. In essence, the expected benefit shows what an insurance
company might have expected to pay to the families of workplace accident
victims earning the national weekly wage during the course of a year. For
such workers in New Jersey in 1911, an insurer might have anticipated
paying out $8.81 per worker, or approximately 1.19 percent of the worker's
annual earnings, in workers' compensation benefits. The expected benefits
as a percentage of annual earnings in the first year of operation are shown
in table 3.1. Expected benefits ranged from 0.87 percent of annual earn-
ings in Georgia in 1921 and Virginia in 1919 to 2.93 percent of annual
earnings in North Dakota in 1919. More details on the calculation of ex-
pected benefits are provided in appendix B. The states amended their ben-
efit levels every few years; therefore, the relative generosity of benefits
across states varied from year to year. In chapter 7 we discuss the factors
determining the choice of benefit levels and table 7.1 compares the ex-
pected benefits in each state from the first year of operation through 1930.
Mary Conyngton's (1917) surveys of workers' compensation in OhioNote: See appendix B. The expected benefit is the weighted sum of the present value of fatal
accident payments, the present value of hand payments, and the present value of the five-
week disability payment. The weights are the probability of this type of accident. The same
probabilities were used for all states and are based on averages for manufacturing in Oregon
(Oregon Industrial Accident Commission 1919, 28-42). The probability of a fatal accident
over the course of a year was 0.001895, for a permanent total disability 0.000136, for perma-
nent partial disability 0.0099, and for temporary total disability 0.1199. We used the fatal
accident present value as a measure for the permanent total disability benefits because they
were so similar in nearly all the states. We scaled the hand present value down to 21.8 percent
of the level listed above because the average value paid for permanent partial disabilities was
about 21.8 percent of the hand value (see accident statistics reported in Wisconsin Industrial
Commission [1915, 41; 1916, 44; 1917, 6-7] for 1914 to 1917).
and Connecticut in 1915 found that the families of fatal accident victims
generally received the benefits to which they were entitled. In Ohio the
families' actual death benefits were on average equal to 98.8 percent of
the weekly payment that we estimated the families should have received
using the statutory rules and each worker's reported weekly wage. In fact,
46 percent of the actual payments were the same as predicted by the stat-
ute, 34 percent were slightly higher, and 20 percent were slightly lower. In
58Chapter 3








First of Annual First of Annual
State Year Earnings State Year Earnings
Cal. 1911 1.78 Cob. 1915 1.00
N.J. 1911 1.19 md. 1915 1.33
Nev. 1911 1.33 La. 1915 1.21
Wash. 1911 2.23 Mont. 1915 1.35
Wis. 1911 2.02 Okla. 1915 0.85
Ill. 1912 1.54 Vt. 1915 1.06
Kan. 1912 1.28 Wyo. 1915 1.08
Mass. 1912 1.72 Ky. 1916 1.63
Md. 1912 1.33 Me. 1916 1.30
Mich. 1912 1.19 Pa. 1916 1.26
Ohio 1912 1.67 N.M. 1917 1.03
R.I. 1912 1.29 S.D. 1917 1.22
N.H. 1912 1.26 Utah 1917 1.43
Ariz. 1913 1.74 Del. 1918 1.01
Minn. 1913 1.21 Idaho 1918 1.47
Neb. 1913 1.34 ND. 1919 2.93
Tex. 1913 1.91 Tenn. 1919 1.08
WVa. 1913 1.73 Va. 1919 0.87
Conn. 1914 1.24 Ala. 1920 1.09
Iowa 1914 1.22 Ga. 1921 0.87
N.Y 1914 2.42 Mo. 1927 1.79
Or. 1914 2.49 NC. 1929 1.59The Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation59
Connecticut, the actual payments averaged 99.9 percent of the predicted
payments based on the statute. Therefore, cross-state comparisons of esti-
mated workers' compensation payments using the statutory rules should
give a reasonable measure of the actual amounts that injured workers and
their families received. Note, however, that both Ohio and Connecticut
had established state bureaucracies to ensure that workers' compensation
benefits were paid to workers and families who were entitled to them. In
the states that did not establish a bureaucratic commission and instead
relied on the courts to settle compensation disputes between injured work-
ers and employers, the correlation between what workers received and
what employers were legally obligated to pay may not have been as strong.
3.2 A Comparison of Postaccident Payments under the Negligence
Liability and Workers' Compensation Systems
The primary objective of social reformers and others who lobbied for
workers' compensation was to raise the expected benefits that injured
workers or their heirs received in the event of an industrial accident. Rais-
ing expected benefits meant increasing the percentage of accident victims
who received remuneration and/or the average level of benefits they would
receive. A priori, we cannot state with certainty whether expected benefits
were higher under the old negligence liability system or under workers'
compensation. If the old system followed the common law rules to the
letter, an injured worker who could show employer negligence and get past
the three defenses (assumption of risk, fellow servant, and contributory
negligence) was supposed to be fully compensated for the damages, includ-
ing full replacement of wages. Meanwhile, under workers' compensation
all injured workers received at most two-thirds of their lost income. Thus,
the properly working common law system compensated fewer workers,
but the workers who received payments should have recovered more of
their losses than they would have under workers' compensation. It be-
comes an empirical question whether workers' compensation raised the
expected accident payments by sufficiently increasing the percentage of
injured workers compensated to offset the lower replacement rate. The
potential rise in expected benefits under workers' compensation might
have been still larger because, as we point out in chapter 2, it is not clear
how well the de facto employers' liability system followed the dictates of
the common law. For example, the payments to the families of most fatal
accident victims who received some positive amount covered only about
one year of the worker's income. Thus, for some types of accidents, work-
ers' compensation might have led to an increase in both the percentage of
families compensated and the amounts that they received.
Measuring accident remuneration under the negligence liability and
workers' compensation systems is complicated by the various types of60Chapter 3
accidents. The easiest and most accurate comparisons can be made for
fatal accidents. When considering fatal accident payments, there is no
question about the severity of the accident because we know that the vic-
tims of such accidents had the same fate. Moreover, there are fewer re-
porting problems when studying fatal accidents because the event was not
easily concealed. Comparing nonfatal accident compensation is fraught
with difficulty because there exist few data to compare accidents of similar
seventies across the two legal institutions. In this section we focus first on
the payments made to the heirs of fatal accident victims and then turn to
comparisons of the two legal systems when all accident types are consid-
ered as a whole.
3.2.1The Rise in Average Compensation for Fatal Accidents
The shift to workers' compensation raised the expected amount of post-
accident compensation for fatal accidents in two important ways. First,
the percentage of families that received no compensation fell to close to
zero. For example, Mary Conyngton's (1917, 109) survey of Ohio andCon-
necticut families of fatally injured workers in 1915 revealed that only 2.9
and 9.4 percent, respectively, received no benefits under workers' compen-
sation. In those cases where the families received nothing, there was a
strong likelihood that the accident did not occur in the workplace or oc-
curred because the worker was intoxicated or had maliciously caused his
own accident, either of which barred monetary recoveryThe percentages
of those not receiving compensation under workers' compensation are
substantially lower than even the lowest percentages reported for the negli-
gence liability system in table 2.1.
Second, for those families that received a positive amount of compensa-
tion for the death of their primary wage earners, the average payments
were significantly higher under workers' compensationthan under negli-
gence liability. The information on fatal accident payments undernegli-
gence liability in table 2.1 shows that average payments tothose families
receiving positive amounts ranged from 0.58 of a year's earnings in Vir-
ginia coal mines in the period 1916 to 1918 to 1.48 of a year's earnings for
nonrailroad workers in Illinois prior to 1911. The average for all the sam-
ples was a negligence liability payment of about one year's earnings. By
contrast, under workers' compensation the present value of fatal accident
payments ranged from 1.94 to 8.26 times annual earnings in most states
(see appendix table B.l). The gap between fatal accident payments under
workers' compensation and negligence liability is still larger when we fac-
tor in the probability of receiving a payment under the negligence liability
system. In expected terms, then, the heirs of fatal accident victims could
expect to receive only about one-half year's earnings prior to the adoption
of workers' compensation.The Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation 61
3.2.2The Rise in Expected Compensation for All Types of Accidents
When the analysis is expanded to include both nonfatal and fatal acci-
dents, the available data further show that when workers' compensation
was introduced, average expected accident benefits increasedsubstantially.
Various estimates of the accident compensation paid out under the two
systems suggest that the workers' compensation system was, on average,
1.7 to 4 times more generous than negligence liability.
We have attempted to calculate expected benefits under the two systems,
holding the underlying risk of a workplace accident constant. We define
the expected benefit E(B) as follows:
(1) E(B) = pB +
where pj is the probability of a fatal accident, Bis the average benefit paid
out for a fatal accident, and the subscript n refers to nonfatal accidents.
To make comparisons across time, we then normalized the expected ben-
efits by dividing by average annual income. Thus, the final comparisons
are quoted in terms of percentages of annual income or percentagesof
employers' payrolls. We made the comparisons from two types of sources:
workers' reports of the remuneration they received when injured at work
and employers' reports of what they paid out to workers.
Comparisons Based on Workers' Reports
To make the calculations based on workers' reports, we used the same
probabilities of fatal and nonfatal accidents for both regimes.2 We then
calculated expected benefits under negligence liability using the average
amounts of payments reported in the workers' samples. Information on
individual workers' remuneration under negligence liability was collected
from the New York Commission on Employers' Liability (NYCEL 1910,
246-50), which reported medical payments and wage replacement
amounts that workers received from their employers. The data were origi-
nally collected from a series of direct interviews conducted on a random
sample of workers who had been injured and whose accidents had been
reported to the New York Bureau of Factory Inspection in 1907 (NYCEL
1910, 210-11). To calculate expected benefits under workers' compensa-
tion, we used the 1914 New York workers' compensation law to determine
the present value of the stream of payouts for different types of accidents.
In addition, we have limited the comparison to wage replacement only
and have ignored how medical payments differed under the two legal sys-
tems. Our impression is that medical coverage was better under workers'
compensation; therefore, the elimination of medical payments would bias
the comparison against finding that workers' compensation benefits were
relatively higher.62Chapter 3
The New York wage replacement comparisons suggest that the expected
wage replacement benefits under workers' compensation were at least 1.75
times as generous as the expected benefit under negligence liability. The
estimate that workers' compensation on average paid about 1.75 times as
much as negligence liability treats the sample from the NYCEL report
as a random sample of the "true" number of accidents under the negli-
gence system. Large numbers of nonfatal accidents that would have been
compensable under workers' compensation, however, probably went un-
reported under negligence liability. In addition, it is likely that the unre-
ported injured workers received little or no compensation; therefore, the
average compensation reported for nonfatal injuries under employers' lia-
bility in the NYCEL study is likely overstated. By making conservative
adjustments for the underreporting of accidents, we have calculated that
workers' compensation benefits in New York were 2.5 times as generous
as those under the employers' liability system. See appendix C for more de-
tails on these calculations.
Even this estimate of a 2.5-fold rise may be understated if we are cor-
rect that medical benefits were more generous under workers' compensa-
tion. The measured increase in benefits also understates the rise in the net
amount that workers received after they paid their legal expenses. Evi-
dence from various sources suggests that when workers hired a lawyer
under the negligence system, contingency fees ranged from 20 to 50 per-
cent. Since many workers did not hire lawyers to represent them, the pay-
ments to lawyers probably amounted to between 13 and 23 percent of the
total amount that workers received under negligence. Some workers also
used lawyers to contest claims under workers' compensation, although
legal expenses probably consumed less than 5 percent of the total amount
that workers received. Thus, after making adjustments for legal payments,
the net expected amount an injured worker received might have risen by
as much as 300 percent with the introduction of workers' compensation.
Comparisons Based on Employers' Reports
As a second way of comparing the generosity of benefits under the two
systems, we examined how much employers reported that they and their
insurance carriers paid out in accident benefits, settlements, and medical
payments as a percentage of their payrolls. One of the advantages of using
employer-reported evidence is that the underreporting of accidents is
much less of a problem than for the data collected from workers. Employ-
ers reported how much they paid out for insurance and in direct payments
to workers, and they did not have to reveal any information about acci-
dents for which they made no payments. Thus, when making their reports
about accident compensation, employers did not have to worry about giv-
ing factory inspectors specific information about accident problems in
their establishments. In fact, to the extent that the generosity of accidentThe Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation 63
benefits enhanced an employer's reputation, firms may have had an incen-
tive to overstate their accident payments.
How much employers paid out for accident compensation conflates
both the probability of occurrence and the amount actually paid. Thus,
we try to hold the underlying accident risk constant by comparing the
same industries in the same state during a period when there would have
been little change in accident rates. The Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and
Industrial Statistics (WBLIS) in 1906 conducted a survey of employers to
determine their accident expenses and how much of this money actually
went to workers in the form of wage replacement and medical benefits
(WBLIS 1909, 31, 34-35). The WBLIS survey found that employers paid
approximately $0245 in wage and medical compensation for every $100
they paid in wages. Under workers' compensation in 1913, by contrast, the
Wisconsin Industrial Commission (1915, 32-38) calculated that workers
received wage and medical benefits of $0.82 for every $100 of payroll. This
comparison suggests that workers' compensation in Wisconsin was 3.35
times more generous than the negligence liability system.
We were concerned that this Wisconsin comparison might be unreliable
because the coverage of industries in 1906 and 1913 differed. To examine
this issue more carefully, we matched industries from the 1906 and 1913
listings and found that in all but one of the twenty-three comparisons
workers' compensation benefits exceeded those under negligence liability
(see appendix table C. 1). In fifteen of the twenty-three comparisons, work-
ers' compensation was greater than two times more generous than negli-
gence liability, and in nine of the twenty-three comparisons workers' com-
pensation was more than three times as generous.
As a second measure, we examined the records of the Stonega Coke and
Coal Company in Virginia before and after the introduction of workers'
compensation on 1 January 1919. During the years 1916 to 1918, Stonega
spent roughly $0.97 per $100 on the payroll in compensating injured work-
ers or their families. During the period 1919 to 1923, afterworkers' com-
pensation was established, Stonega spent approximately $1.70 per $100
on the payroll, which is about 74 percent higher than the payouts under
negligence liability.3 It should be noted that this rise in accident benefits is
smaller than those we calculated for Wisconsin and New York in part
because Virginia in 1919 had one of the least generous workers' compensa-
tion laws in the United States. Virginia's statutory benefit levels in 1919
were roughly half the benefit levels in Wisconsin in 1913 and 40 percent
of New York's benefit levels in 1914 (see table 3.1 for a comparison).
The rise in benefits that we have documented for workers' compensation
using the employer-reported data may be understated in two ways. The
benefits under workers' compensation do not include medical payments
or funeral expenses, and we know that employers did pay some medical
and funeral expenses under the negligence system that were most likely64Chapter 3
included in their aggregate expenditure statistics. Furthermore, we did not
subtract legal fees that workers paid under the two systems, which would
have made workers' compensation look even more beneficent than the
negligence system.
3.3The Impact of Workers' Compensation on Wages
The substantial rise in postaccident benefits led reformers and many
social historians to hail workers' compensation as a dramatic improve-
ment in worker welfare. Economists since Adam Smith, however, have
suggested that improvements in nonpecuniary benefits are often offset by
compensating reductions in wages. In fact, studies of changes in workers'
compensation benefits over the past twenty years have shown that in-
creases in benefits are associated with reductions in wage rates(Moore
and Viscusi 1990, 24-25; Gruber and Krueger 1991). If labor markets in
the early 1900s operated in a similar fashion, the rise in postaccident com-
pensation when states switched to workers' compensation potentially
would have been offset by a decline in the risk premium implicit in wages.
At least some employers were aware of this phenomenon when workers'
compensation was being discussed. A prominent Washington employer
described how a cost-increasing provision in the state's 19 11 workers'
compensation law would ultimately affect workers: "[T]hey were working
a hardship on the laboring man, because this 2 cents thatthe employer is
supposed to pay will not eventually come from the employer, but will come
from the laboring man by necessary reduction of wage scale. ...Competi-
tion in all lines in this day is so keen that every employer of labor has to
figure his expenses down to the lowest item, and as Washington will have
to compete with Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and even California in her pro-
ductions, eventually the employer is going to take this 2 cents, this small
amount to him and a small amount on paper, out of his employee."4 Of
course, most employers who supported workers'compensation were not
likely to make these statements very forcefully in public for fear of chilling
the support that workers provided the program.
To examine how wages adjusted in response to the introduction of
workers' compensation, we constructed three separate panel data sets for
relatively dangerous industries in the early 1900s. The first sample covers
hourly wage rates from payrolls collected by the U.S. Bituminous Coal
Commission. The sample contains state averages for ten jobs from the
twenty-three leading coal producing states at the end of each year from
1911 to 1922. The second sample is hourly earnings collected from pay-
rolls by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for ten different jobs in the
lumber industry for the years 1910 to 1913, 1915, 1921, and 1923 in the
twenty-three major lumber producing states. The third sample is the wage
scales listed in union contracts in the building trades for thirteen occupa-The Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation 65
tions in seventy-seven cities for each year between 1907 and l9l3. All
three data sets allow examination of differences across states and over time
during the period when nearly all the workers' compensation laws were
adopted.
For each of the three samples we estimated standard wage equations.
The equations can be used to assess the impact of changing expected post-
accident benefit levels, while controlling for fluctuations in the product
market, the skill levels of the workers, restrictions on working time, geo-
graphic differences in labor markets, and nationwide changes in the labor
market specific to each year. In the coal industry we had enough informa-
tion to control for several additional factors, including strikes and union
strength. A more complete description of the model and the results is
presented in appendix D. The wage equations generally confirm relation-
ships found in numerous other wage studies. Wage rates rose when product
prices increased and when business was improving. More productive and
higher-skilled workers earned higher wages. Strikes and unionization were
associated with higher earnings.
The impact of workers' compensation can be assessed in a variety of
ways. As a simple starting point, we measured the impact of workers' com-
pensation using a dummy variable with a value of one for states and years
in which the workers' compensation law was in effect and a value of zero
otherwise. Using this measure, workers' compensation was associated
with a decline in wages in two of the three industries. In coal mining the
presence of a workers' compensation law reduced hourly earnings by 2.16
percent, while in the lumber industry the reduction was 1.60 percent. In
both cases statistical tests reject the view that workers' compensation had
no effect on wages. In the building trades, however, the decline was smaller
at 0.33 percent, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that workers' compen-
sation had no effect on wages.6
The use of a dummy variable provides only a rough estimate of how
workers' compensation affected wages across the United States because
the laws were associated with more complex changes in accident benefits
than a 0-1 variable can capture. A dummy variable fails to represent the
substantial variation in accident compensation paid out to workers both
under negligence liability and under workers' compensation. The generos-
ity of workers' compensation benefits varied a great deal across states and
across time within states (see tables 3.1, B. lB.4, and 7.1). There also ap-
pear to have been differences in the average benefits paid out across states
under negligence liability. Inspection of employers' liability insurance
manuals shows that rates for this insurance were adjusted depending on a
state's liability rules and the outcomes of litigation in the state. For ex-
ample, holding the type of industry constant, a firm in Ohio under negli-
gence liability would have paid insurance premiums that were 1.8 times
larger than the rates a similar firm in Illinois would have paid (DeLeon66Chapter 3
1907, 26-27). These differentials presumably correspond to the different
amounts of compensation workers in these two states would have received
if they were injured under the negligence liability system.
To capture this variation in compensation we have developed a measure
of expected benefits in each of the industries. Expected benefits under
workers' compensation are constructed by first calculating the gross ben-
efits a worker or his family would have received had he been killed or
suffered a permanent total disability, a permanent partial disability, or a
temporary four-week disability. We then converted these gross benefitesti-
mates into an expected benefit measure by weighting each of the four types
of accident benefits by the probability that each type of accident would
occur and then summing the four expectedcompensation estimates (see
appendix B for details of these calculations).7
The expected benefits variable measures the monetary value that a risk-
neutral worker would place on his expected accident compensation.8 If
workers were risk-averse, however, our measure of expected compensation
actually provides a lower-bound estimate of the value that workers would
have placed on these postaccident benefits. The expected benefits measure
also is strongly correlated with the employers' costs of purchasing workers'
compensation insurance because workers' compensation insurance and
employers' liability insurance were experience rated.9 Employers probably
would have paid insurance premiums that were about 1.67 times the ex-
pected benefit measure, based on administrative load factors quoted by
contemporary insurance texts on workers' compensation insurance (see
Kulp 1928, 246).
Table 3.2 contains estimates of the sizes of the wage offset from the
wage regressions. The letter superscripts mark estimatesfor which we can
reject the hypothesis that workers' compensation had no effect at conven-
tional levels of statistical significance. A coefficient of - 1 implies that
workers fully paid for increases in the expected benefits that they received,
although the worker would not have fully paid for the employer's cost of
purchasing the insurance to provide those benefits. Coefficients around
1.67 imply that employers were able to pass on their full insurance costs




Unionized building trades 0.02 0.17
Sources: See table D.l and Fishback and Kantor (1995, 732).
'Statistically significantly different from zero in a one-tailed test at the 1 percent level.
bStatistically significantly different from zero in a one-tailed test at the 15 percent level.
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to workers. Using modern data, Gruber and Krueger (1991) estimate that
workers in the 1970s and 1980s paid for between 56 and 86 percent of
their employers' workers' compensation costs. Their results suggest that
workers more than paid for the value of the expected benefits that they
actually received, but did not fully pay for the insurance costs that employ-
ers bore. On the other hand, Moore and Viscusi (1990, 50-51) find wage
offsets of approximately 3 times the expected value of the worker's acci-
dent benefits and 2.4 times employers' insurance costs.
Our estimates of the wage offsets using the full samples and the most
complete set of control variables are listed in table 3.2. Coal and lumber
workers in the early 1 900s experienced wage reductions that were similar
to the ones found in modern studies, while the contractual wages in the
unionized building trades barely responded to the increase in postaccident
benefits. The estimates in the coal and lumber industries are generally
within the range found in modern data. The coal estimate of 1.72 in the
first column implies that hourly earnings fell 1.72 cents for each 1 cent
increase in the worker's expected accident benefits. Thus, coal workers
paid not only for increases in the benefits they expected to receive, but
also for the consequent 1.67 cent increase in their employers' insurance
costs. Using an alternative semilog specification that is often used in wage
analyses, the estimated offset in the second column for the coal industry
is somewhat larger at 2.5. In the lumber industry the estimated offset is
not as large, ranging from 1.04 to 0.69, but it is still in the range that
Gruber and Krueger found in their study of the modern workers' compen-
sation system. By contrast, contractual wages in the unionized building
trades did not adjust downward to increases in accident compensation.
The coefficient is positive (0.02) and not statistically significant. These re-
sults are generally robust to changes in the control variables and time peri-
ods covered in the analysis. A complete discussion of the robustness of the
results can be found in appendix D and Fishback and Kantor (1995).
The finding of no wage offset in the building trades might be due to the
unionization of the industry. Unionization enabled workers to fend off
wage reductions in the face of increased employer mandates. We might
expect such a result from the building trades, which were the most stable
labor organizations in the United States in the early 1900s (Taft 1964,
203). Other studies have shown that workers in unions receive larger com-
pensating differentials for accepting accident risk (Dickens 1984). Moore
and Viscusi (1990, 110-20) find that unionized workers experience smaller
wage offsets when workers' compensation benefits increase. Dickens
(1984) suggests that the unionnonunion variation might arise purely from
the differences in the bargaining power of the two sets of workers. Alterna-
tively, Moore and Viscusi (1990) argue that unions obtain better benefits
because they represent the preferences of the average worker, whereas the
preferences of the marginal worker determine compensating differentials68Chapter 3
Table 3.3 Union and Nonunion Wage Offsets in the Coal Industry
1911 to 1922 1911 to 1915
Sources: See appendix table D.2 and Fishback and Kantor (1995, 735).
Statistically significantly different from zero in a one-tailed test at the 1 percent level.
in competitive markets. Union wages might also be slower to adjust to
changes in postaccident compensation because the wages are set in ex-
plicit contracts that might be renegotiated every two to three years.'°
We can further test the impact of unionization on wage offsets by ex-
amining the coal sample. In the coal industry the differences in unioniza-
tion were based on geography, not occupations, because the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA) sought to unionize workers in all jobs into
a single union. Using the percentage of workers in the state with paid-up
membership in the UMWA as a measure of unionization, we have reestim-
ated the wage offsets for the coal industry allowing for different wage re-
sponses for union and nonunion workers. Table 3.3 shows the offsets cal-
culated from the regression equation with the unionexpected benefits
interaction term included, for both the overall sample and the sample for
the period prior to 1916. Under the linear specification, the offset for a
worker in a completely nonunion district would have been 2.68. Mean-
while, the offset for a worker in a completely unionized district would have
been 0.44, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that unionized workers
experienced no wage offset. The effect of unionization is sensitive to speci-
fication in the full sample, however. The union offset in the semilog speci-
fication in the second column of table 3.3 is slightly larger than the non-
union effect, although the difference between the two is not statistically
significant.
The impact of unionization on wages can be explored further by re-
stricting the sample to the years prior to 1916. The differences in the re-
sults for the two specifications using the full sample might be driven by
measurement error in the union variable during and after World War I.
The union membership variable might not fully reflect the long-term
strength of the union during and immediately after World War I. The U.S.
Fuel Administrator had forced many coal firms to negotiate contracts with
the union during the war, thus union membership might understate the
union's strength in some areas during World War I. After the war a sub-
stantial number of firms repudiated the contracts while union membership
was still increasing. When we limit the sample to the pre-1916 years, as
reported in the third and fourth columns of table 3.3, the union wage offset
Coal nonunion 2.68k 2.29k _2.46a 2.57k
Coal union 0.44 2.80k 0.49 1.94
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is substantially smaller than the nonunion offset under both specifications.
Our analysis of wages near the time workers' compensation was enacted
suggests that nonunion workers essentially "bought" a portion of the
higher benefits under workers' compensation in the form of lower real
wages. Unionized workers, on the other hand, seem to havebenefited di-
rectly from the higher de jure benefits because they were able to stave off
the wage reductions that nonunion workers experienced." The presence
of wage offsets for nonunion workers also helps to solve one of the major
puzzles in the political economy of the passage of workers' compensation.
Even though workers' compensation transferred a significant part of the
legal burden of postaccident compensation onto employers, many employ-
ers led the way in supporting the legislation (Lubove 1967;Weinstein
1967). Many employers may have supported the legislation in anticipation
of passing a substantial portion of their costs onto their workers in the
form of lower wages, as the quotation from the Washington employer
above suggests.
Politically, workers' attitudes toward workers' compensation may have
been influenced by the extent of the wage offset that they could anticipate.
In the final analysis both workers and employers might have benefited
from the legislation because the wage offsets implied that the employer
mandate did not create a large-scale redistribution of income. By support-
ing workers' compensation, employers could satisfy their workers' de-
mands for better postaccident benefits without having to fully pay for the
apparent largesse. Finally, even though their wages might have fallen, risk-
averse workers might have benefited from workers' compensation if they
were poorly insured against workplace accident risk in the early twentieth
century. In the next section, we provide evidence that workers indeed faced
difficulty insuring their workplace accident risk privately prior to the
adoption of workers' compensation.
3.4The Impact of Workers' Compensation on
Household Saving and Insurance Purchases
By raising the average accident benefits that accident victims or their
families received and by making the payment of these benefits more cer-
tain, workers' compensation in essence became the first widespread social
insurance program in the United States. Since the introduction of workers'
compensation, the United States has implemented a number of additional
social insurance programs, including social security, unemployment insur-
ance, and subsidized health insurance. Because these programs reduce the
uncertainty of future income fluctuations, economists predict that social
insurance programs should reduce workers' incentives to hold precaution-
ary savings and should crowd out private insurance purchases.12 Numer-
ous empirical studies of modern programs confirm these predictions.1370Chapter 3
One reason precautionary saving would fall as a result of the introduc-
tion of a social insurance program, such as workers' compensation, is that
workers beforehand could not purchase complete insurance coverage to
insure against misfortune's occurrence. In this section we examine how the
introduction of workers' compensation affected precautionary saving and
insurance purchases using a sample of over seven thousand working-class
households canvassed for the 1917-1919 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
cost-of-living survey. We find that workers used precautionary saving to
insure against workplace accident risk in the early twentieth century. Be-
cause saving was a relatively expensive means of insuringagainst accident
risk, we conclude that workers probably faced limits in the amounts of
workplace accident insurance they were able to purchase prior to work-
ers' compensation. Qualitative evidence drawn from insurance industry
sources confirms our view that the insurance market aroundthe turn of
the century constrained workers' ability to insure their workplace acci-
dent risk.
3.4.1Insuring against Accident Risk
Contemporary evidence suggests that working-class families in the early
1900s insured against workplace accident risk in a variety of ways. Most
families saved. Some purchased limited amounts of commercial life and
accident insurance. Others insured through employer-based funds or fra-
ternal societies. A number of families sent children or spouses to work,
took in boarders, and/or moved in with extended family when an acci-
dent occurred.
Various state and federal government surveys prior to the turn of the
century give some indication of the extent to which workers purchased
insurance prior to workers' compensation. Whaples and Buffum (1991,
102) found that 16 percent of the 5,020 Michigan furniture workers in an
1890 survey purchased some form of life insurance, while 40 percent
claimed accident/sickness insurance through membership in a benefit soci-
ety.'4 Surveys of Kansas nonagricultural workers from 1884 through 1887
show that 26 percent belonged to benefit societies, while 5.5 percent had
bought some form of accident insurance (Ransom and Sutch 1989). In an
1890 survey of Maine workers, 22.8 percent claimed to have had life insur-
ance, while 32.6 percent were members of a benefit society(Ransom and
Sutch 1990)15
Several other surveys provide evidence on insurance coverage just prior
to the introduction of workers' compensation. The Minnesota Bureau of
Labor, Industries, and Commerce (1909-1910) found that 46.3 percent of
the families of fatal accident victims collected insurance that replaced an
average of 1.4 times the deceased's annual earnings prior to the establish-
ment of compensation legislation in that state. In Conyngton's (1917) sur-
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1915, which was before the state's adoption of workers' compensation,
82. 1 percent of the families received payments from some form of insur-
ance, compared with 63 percent in the workers'compensation states of
Ohio and Connecticut.
The most comprehensive picture of household purchases of insurance
during the early 1900s can be found in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) 1917-1919 cost-of-living survey (1986). Table 3.4 shows the percent-
ages of households from the survey that held various forms of insurance.
By the early 191 Os, families who sought to purchase private insurance
against workplace accident risk had several options. The most widely held
life insurance was industrial insurance, purchased by 67.6 percent of the
households in the BLS sample. The industrial policies were also known as
"burial" insurance because the average payout of $138 generally covered
only the cost of a burial (Kip 1953, 18; Dryden 1914, 384; Ackerman
1926, 5-12).
About half of the families in the BLS sample sought to replace part of
the household head's income if he died through the purchase of old-line
insurance or fraternal life insurance. In the BLS sample, 29.2 percent of
the households held old-line (or whole life) policies that insured lives and
incorporated the accumulation of dividends that could be borrowed
Source: Fishback and Kantor (1996, 425). The original data are from a survey by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Cost-of-Living in the United States, 1917-19, which is available
through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, No. 8299.
Notes: A number of households held multiple insurance policies. For example, 3.8 percent
of the households (or 12.8 percent of the policyholders) held old-line insurance policies on
more than one member of the household; 58.4 percent of the households (or 86.4 percent
of the policyholders) held industrial life insurance on more than one member of the house-
hold; 6.9 percent of the households (26.6 percent of the policyholders) held fraternal life
insurance on more than one member of the household; 0.1 percent of the households had
establishment life insurance on more than one family member; and 0.6 percent held other
life insurance on more than one family member.






Old-line life insurance 29.2
Industrial life insurance 67.6
Fraternal life insurance 25.9
Establishment life insurance 3.4
Other life insurance 1.4
All types of life insurance 85.2
All types of life insurance except industrial 51.6
Accident insurance 10.0
N 7,47572Chapter 3
against or surrendered. Roughly one-fourth of the households that were
interviewed bought life insurance through fraternal societies. These were
mostly national organizations bound together by religious, occupational,
ethnic, or fraternal ties. Most local societies belonged to a national parent
organization that issued "certificates" of membership that entitled mem-
bers' beneficiaries to death benefits and usually provided for a limited
stream of payments in the event of disability (Nichols 1914; Insurance Re-
search and Review Service 1938; Kip 1953). There were no standard death
benefits and disability plans, so each worker's access to fraternal insur-
ance varied depending on his religion, occupation, industry, or labor or-
ganization (see, e.g., U.S. Commissioner of Labor 1909). Considering all
forms of life insurance together,the typical household in the BLS sample
seems to have purchased enough insurance to replace about one year's
income.
16
The three types of life insurance discussed above were not directly tar-
geted at workplace accidents because they insured against all causes of
death. Mortality statistics for the working-age population suggest that
workplace accidents probably accounted for at most 2 percent of all
deaths from 1915 to l920.' Insurance companies therefore designed acci-
dent insurance that limited their liability to injury and death arising from
"external, violent, and accidental means." Precisely defining an accident
was an evolving enterprise as insurers and insureds relied on the courts to
settle vast differences in interpretation (Cornelius 1920). Accident insur-
ance was clearly written with an eye toward insuring occupational acci-
dent risk, as each industry and occupational class was categorized accord-
ing to its level of danger (Aetna Insurance Company 1919)18 Evidence
offered by Faulkner (1940, 27) suggests that occupational accidents ac-
counted for approximately 63.3 percent of all accidental deaths in 1913,
although the percentage had fallen to 28.3 percent by 1938 because of
advancements in safety programs and devices.'9
Although accident insurance represented the most direct way for work-
ers to insure against occupational accident risk, the personal accidentin-
surance business was very limited in the early twentieth century Only
$18.8 million in accident premiums were collected by commercial insur-
ance companies in 1911, compared with $564.7 million in wholelife pre-
miums and $750.9 million in industrial life premiums (Hayden's Annual
Cyclopedia of Insurance 1913, 4, l54-55, 180-81). Among the households
that the BLS surveyed in 1917 to 1919, 10 percent had an accident insur-
ance policy.
The commercial accident insurance market was clearly limited by the
informational problems of insuring an individual worker's accident risk.
With little information on the accident-proneness of the individual, the
insurance industry based insurance premiums on occupational averages.
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tional information flows that were useful for experience rating in other
lines of insurance were poorly developed in the accident insurance line.
The national organization formed in 1914 was described by insurance ex-
ecutive G. F. Michelbacher (1942, 159) as "largely ornamental" with an
inadequate staff providing "inconsequential statistical exhibits" compiled
with data collected by other organizations. The lack of effective informa-
tion for setting rates would have led to adverse selection problems, as more
accident-prone workers would have purchased the insurance and more
careful workers would not. Insurance companies could expect no help
from employers in identifying accident-prone workers because negligence
liability rules allowed employers to invoke the contributory negligence de-
fense to avoid compensating careless workers. Thus, employers had less
incentive to fire irresponsible workers or to impose restrictions on their be-
havior.
The standard means of reducing problems of adverse selection is to
limit the amount of insurance a worker can buy or to establish pricing
policies designed to discourage more accident-prone individuals. Accident
insurers followed both practices. The Aetna Insurance Company (1919,
96) imposed limits on the risks they would insure, setting death benefit
maximums as low as $250 for coal miners, who faced the most dangerous
working conditions in the early twentieth century. Physicians, on the other
hand, could insure up to $10,000 for accidental death. Further, accident
insurance was noted for its high load factors. Even with the high loads, a
number of companies writing accident insurance failed over the period
1917 to 1926, while the surviving stock companies suffered a slight under-
writing loss (Kulp 1928, 576). The end result was that many workers were
unable to purchase complete coverage, and possibly some were shut out
of the market altogether.
Workers also tried to obtain insurance through union funds and estab-
lishment funds, which were nearly entirely financed by workers' contribu-
tions. These funds expanded the range of insurance that workers could
obtain, but typically the amount of coverage they provided was small.2° In
1908, the average death benefit was $109 in establishment funds and $89
in union funds, perhaps enough to cover burial expenses. Many funds
offered no temporary disability benefits. In the establishment and union
funds where temporary disability benefits were available, the average maxi-
mum benefit was about five dollars, and the payments only lasted for an
average of fifteen weeks (U.S. Commissioner of Labor 1909, 234-67, 448-
87). In contrast, five dollars was typically the minimum payment under
workers' compensation and benefits for long-term disabilities lasted up to
three to five years.
In general, the BLS survey shows that a wide range of workers pur-
chased at least some form of insurance. Inmost cases the amount of insur-
ance they purchased was limited either by choice or because there were74Chapter 3
specific constraints on the amount of coverage insurers or benefit societies
offered to workers. Absent full insurance coverage, families could always
save against the possibility of an accident. However, saving was arelatively
costly means of insurance. At an interest rate of 5 percent, for example, a
family that sought to hold a year's income in reserve would have had to
forgo consumption of 95 percent of their income in the current year or
wait several years to reach its goal. Families could also rely on children to
work if the primary wage earner was injured or killed in an accident.21
Numerous scholars have found that sending children to work was an im-
portant means by which families survived hard times and accumulated
savings at the turn of the century (see Modell 1979; Goldin 1981; Haines
1985; Keyssar 1986, 158-60; and Rotella and Alter 1993).
3.4.2The Theoretical Impact of Workers'
Compensation on Saving and Insurance
Given that many households had relatively little life or accident insur-
ance coverage in the early twentieth century, families mayhave relied
strongly on precautionary saving to insure against accident risk. The in-
crease in postaccident benefits that workers' compensationguaranteed
may have affected households' decisions in two ways.As Cutler and Grub-
er's (1996) study of the modern Medicaid system implies, households may
have reduced their accident insurance purchases, seeing the higher work-
ers' compensation benefits as a replacement for private insurance. Simi-
larly, as Leland (1968) and Kotlikoff (1989, 145-51) predict, if households
were using precautionary savings to protectthemselves against workplace
accident risk, they would also have reduced their precautionary saving as
the introduction of social insurance benefits reduced the uncertainty of
future income loss from an industrial accident.
In fact, observed changes in family saving patterns in response to
changes in postaccident compensation enable us to determine whether
workers' access to accident insurance was constrained or not. In appendix
E we develop theoretical predictions from a two-period model of saving
and insurance choices when workers are faced with a positive probability
of a workplace accident. The predictions from the model indicate that if
workers were able to purchase all of the insurance that they desired at
actuarially fair premiums, then an increase in postaccident benefits would
have led to an increase in saving and a reduction in insurance purchases.
In other words, workers would have perceived the increase in postaccident
benefits as an increase in their expected incomes, which they could have
funneled either into saving or consumption. On the other hand, the model
suggests that the only condition under which workers would reduce their
saving when postaccident benefits rise is when they faced binding limits
on the amounts of insurance coverage they could purchase. Faced with
such rationing, workers were forced to rely on precautionary saving toThe Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation 75
help protect themselves against accident risk. The introduction of work-
ers' compensation and its relatively generous postaccident benefits pro-
vided better insurance than workers were able to obtain privately, which,
in turn, would have allowed them to use income previously targeted for
precautionary saving for other purposes. Workers faced with binding lim-
its on insurance availability might still have reduced their insurance cover-
age when postaccident compensation rose if their desired level of coverage
was below the limits imposed by the insurer. That is, workers' compensa-
tion might have crowded out private accident insurance consumption un-
der certain circumstances.
The theoretical and empirical research of other scholars suggests that
the certainty and generosity of the workers' compensation benefits should
have led to a reduction in workers' private insurance, whether through
formal or informal channels. At the same time, our theoretical analysis
indicates that a decline in precautionary saving as a result of the introduc-
tion of workers' compensation might signal that workers had problems
purchasing their desired levels of accident insurance prior to the laws' pas-
sage. Therefore, risk-averse workers, even if they "bought" the higher ben-
efits through wage reductions, might still have gained from workers' com-
pensation. In essence, they were able to obtain a higher level of protection
against accident risk than was available to them under the negligence
system.
3.4.3Empirical Estimates of the Impact of Workers'
Compensation on Insurance and Saving Behavior
To examine how variations in expected postaccident benefits influenced
precautionary saving and private insurance coverage, we analyzed a cross-
section of data on working-class households' financial decisions in both
workers' compensation states and negligence liability states around 1918.
Between late 1917 and early 1919 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics con-
ducted an intricate survey of the consumption patterns of working-class
families in industrial centers of the United States. The study established
the budget weights for the consumer price index (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics 1924). Agents interviewed 12,817 families of wage earners or
salaried workers in ninety-nine cities in forty-two states. From this group
we extracted a sample of 7,475 families where the household head was a
laborer, operative, or craft worker. For more details on the sample and the
analysis, see appendix F and Kantor and Fishback (1996).
We used the information from the cost-of-living survey to examine the
impact of workers' compensation on the household's saving and purchases
of accident and life insurance. That impact is estimated using an expected
benefits measure similar to the one we used in the wage analysis above. In
addition, the analysis controlled for other factors that might have influ-
enced saving and insurance decisions.2276Chapter 3
Table 3.5 Effect of Rising Accident Benefits on Saving and Insurance Purchases
Sources: See Fishback and Kantor (1996, 432-37) and appendix table Fl.
Notes: The effects reported here show how a one-standard-deviation increase ($7. 15) in ex-
pected benefits, evaluated at the sample means in the sample, would have affected the vari-
ables in the table. The effects reported are based on coefficients from a probit analysis of
insurance purchases and ordinary least squares analysis of saving. The assumed $7. 15 in-
crease in expected benefits is roughly half the size of the mean level of expected benefits in
the sample.
a5tatistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The effects of an increase in expected postaccident benefits are sum-
marized in table 3.5, which shows the impact of a one-standard-deviation
increase in expected benefits ($7.15) from the mean level in the sample
($14.67). We chose to look at the impact of a one-standard-deviation in-
crease because it is close to the change in expected benefits thatmight have
occurred with a shift from negligence liability to workers' compensation.
Life insurance was largely unaffected by changes in expected post-
accident benefits. A one-standard-deviation change in the expected post-
accident benefits would have lowered the probability of purchasing life
insurance by only 0.1 percentage pointfrom 86.1 percent to 86.2 per-
cent. We cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect on statistical grounds.
Workers may not have changed their life insurance coverage much in re-
sponse to changes in postaccident benefits because they were largely insur-
ing against fatality risks not associated with the workplace. Recall that
workplace accidents accounted for no more than 2 percent of the fatalities
for the working-age population during this time period.
Changes in expected accident benefits had more influence on the prob-
ability of purchasing accident insurance, as a one-standard-deviation
change in the benefits would have lowered that probability by 1.9 percent-
age points. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect. A
change of 1.9 percentage points is relatively large given that only 10 per-
cent of the households in the sample were purchasing accident insurance.
As workers' compensation shifted the financial incidence of industrial ac-
cidents onto employers, those workers who were purchasing some private
accident insurance substituted the guarantee of higher postaccident bene-
fits for their own personal coverage.
The results from the saving regression show clearly that in the absence
of complete insurance coverage, working-class families reduced their pre-
Variable Affected
Change in probability of purchasing life insurance (%) 0.1
Change in probability of purchasing accident insurance (%) 1.9
Change in savings ($)
Full sample ll.58
Full sample (alternative specification) _8.29a
Sample focused on workers' compensation states - 16.06aThe Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation77
cautionary saving in response to increases in postaccident benefits. Using
the full sample, a one-standard-deviation increase in expected benefits was
associated with a reduction in saving of between$8.29and $11.58,de-
pending on the specification. In all cases statistical tests reject the hypoth-
esis that a rise in expected benefits had no effect.23 As one example of the
impact of a switch from negligence liability to workers' compensation,
consider a worker who moved from Virginia, where negligence liability
was still in force, to the neighboring workers' compensation state of Mary-
land. All else equal, his expected postaccident benefits would have risen
by approximately $11. Such an increase would have allowed him to reduce
his precautionary saving by between$12.88and$17.82,or between18to
25percent of the mean level of savings in the sample.
To check the robustness of these estimates, we also conducted the anal-
yses by limiting the sample to those states with workers' compensation.
One potential criticism of the full-sample estimates is that states without
workers' compensation in1918tended to be southern states, where saving
might have been lower. Further, there may be questions about measure-
ment error in the non-workers' compensation states because we could not
rely on explicit laws to estimate the expected accident benefits in such
states. Such concerns are unfounded, however. When we estimate the sav-
ing equation on a sample that eliminated the non-workers' compensation
states, the effect of a one-standard-deviation change in expected benefits
was actually larger. For more details on other tests of the robustness of
the results, see appendix F.
In general, the regression results show that the higher benefits under
workers' compensation were associated with some crowding-out of private
insurance purchases and substantially lower saving. The reduction in sav-
ing is consistent with the view that workers faced binding constraints on
the amount of workplace accident insurance that they could obtain.
Therefore, the introduction of workers' compensation may have benefited
workers by giving them better protection against the financial losses from
an accident. This result also helps to explain why many workers favored
the introduction of workers' compensation, even though they may have
fully paid for the law's benefits in the form of lower real wages.
3.5The Impact of Workers' Compensation on Accident Rates
Another metric for comparing the effectiveness of accident liability re-
gimes is the impact on accident rates. Support for workers' compensation
legislation among reformers was partially based on the expectation that
the new laws would reduce workplace accidents. If employers bore a larger
share of the full legal financial burden of workplace accidents, they would
have an incentive to increase their accident prevention activities and, thus,
lower their costs.24 This prediction at face value seems reasonable, but it78Chapter 3
fails to examine the impact of workers' compensation on workers' acci-
dent prevention activities. While a rise in postaccident compensation in-
creases employers' incentives to prevent accidents, it reduces workers' in-
centives because they are able to relax their cautiousness with regard to
accidents while keeping the same or even a higher expected income. In the
economic literature on safety and insurance, this phenomenon is known
as moral hazard.25 Employers and contemporary lawmakers were well
aware of the potential moral hazard problems that might have resulted
from workers' compensation. In fact, employers fought vigorously to limit
the level of benefits to at most two-thirds of earnings to help reduce incen-
tives that might lead to moral hazard. Limiting benefits, however, does
not completely eliminate moral hazard problems. Modern studies suggest
that the problem has increased in severity over the past two decades as
benefit levels have come close to replacing 100 percent of after-tax in-
come.26
Since the rise in postaccident compensation changed accident preven-
tion incentives in opposite directions for workers and employers, it is not
clear, a priori, whether workers' compensation would have raised or low-
ered accident rates. Accident rates tend to fall in settings where employer
prevention increases more than worker prevention declines, and vice
versa. Empirical studies of modern data on the impact of changes in work-
ers' compensation benefits show that the relative strength of changes in
employer and worker prevention efforts vary depending on the particular
context. Most studies of the modern era tend to show that increased gener-
osity of benefits leads to increases in nonfatal injury rates.27 On the other
hand, Moore and Viscusi's (1990, 120-35) study of modern fatal accidents
suggests that the presence of workers' compensation lowers fatal acci-
dents.
The differences between nonfatal and fatal accident rates could be
driven by several possibilities. First, nonfatal accidents typically are much
less expensive to the employer than fatal accidents, thus employers may
find it more cost effective to focus on fatal accident prevention over nonfa-
tal accident prevention. Second, the moral hazard problem is less severe
for accidents that the worker anticipates will lead to more painful disabil-
ity. The moral hazard problem, therefore, is probably least severe for acci-
dents that lead to fatalities because the worker loses his life and does not
share in the postaccident income. The moral hazard problem is exacer-
bated in settings where the expected disability from the accident is less
painful or where it is easier to feign a disability. However, it should be
noted that the relationship between the severity of the disability and moral
hazard depends on workers' knowledge of the type of disability an acci-
dent will cause. In settings where the same type of morally hazardous
behavior might lead to outcomes ranging from an ankle sprain to death,
we are likely to see death rates and nonfatal accident statistics follow simi-The Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation79
lar patterns. Third, some of the rise in modern nonfatal accident rates
might be a result of increased reporting of accidents rather than a rise in
the underlying accident rate. As noted in appendix A, the introduction of
workers' compensation led to a huge increase in the reporting of nonfatal
accidents and much smaller increases in fatal accident reports. All of the
modern studies have tried to carefully control for a possible rise in report-
ing, but all agree that they cannot be certain that the reporting problem is
completely eliminated.
Studies of the impact of the introduction of workers' compensation have
focused on fatal accident risk. The studies by Chelius (1976), Fishback
(1987, 1992), and Buffum (1992) suggest that the introduction of workers'
compensation had substantially different effects on fatal accident rates in
different industries.
Chelius (1976) examined the impact of workers' compensation laws on
deaths using information from the mortality statistics collected by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census for twenty-six states during the years 1900 to 1940.
The data were collected from a variety of states using standardized death
certificates and uniform definitions of causes of death. From these statis-
tics Chelius focused on deaths caused by non-motor-vehicle machinery
accidents, which he found to be the only consistent series of data reflecting
industrial accident risks. Eighty-seven percent of the deaths in this cate-
gory occurred in workplaces, while non-motor-vehicle machinery acci-
dents accounted for about 16 percent of deaths. He then created a death
rate by dividing the number of fatal accidents by the labor force in each
of the states.28 While controlling for the presence of safety regulations in
each state, Chelius found that both employers' liability laws and workers'
compensation laws led to reductions in the non-motor-vehicle machinery
accident death rate.29
Buffum (1992, 102-9, 149-55) reanalyzed the same set of data with
more control variables.30 He reported that when using Chelius's specifica-
tions with his control variables he found the same reduction in the death
rate that Chelius found. However, using alternative specifications, he
found a negative effect of workers' compensation, but the effects are
smaller and he could not reject the hypothesis that workers' compensation
had no effect on fatal accident rates.3' Buffum (1992, 101, l4348) also
studied the impact on railroad accidents of the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act of 1906, which limited the fellow servant and contributory negli-
gence defenses in the interstate railroad industry. Similar to the results
reported by Chelius, Buffum found that the federal law reduced accident
rates in railroading.
In contrast, the coal industry experienced an increase in accident risk
with the introduction of workers' compensation. Fishback (1987; 1992,
11 6-26) examined the impact of workers' compensation and employers'
liability laws on fatal accident rates using a panel data set with information80Chapter 3
on death rates in coal mining from the twenty-threeleading coal states
for the years 1903 to 1930.32 The analysis also controlled for a wide range
of state regulations of coal mining, the price of coal, the use of coal cut-
ting machines, the number of days the mines were open, and strike activity
Both employers' liability laws and workers' compensation laws were asso-
ciated with relatively higher accident rates. The presence of an employers'
liability law was associated with a 20 percent increase in the coal death
rate, while the presence of a workers' compensation law was associated
with a 28 percent increase in fatal accident rates. A 20 percent increase in
accident rates meant that an additional man died for every 965 men work-
ing an average work year in the minesBuffum (1992, 86, 140-42) found
similar results with a slightly different sample he constructed indepen-
dently. In his analysis he found that the adoption of workers' compensa-
tion increased fatalities by 19 percent and the passage of employers' liabil-
ity laws increased fatalities by 25 percent.
The rise in accident rates in coal mining is in some ways a perplexing
phenomenon. We cannot completely dismiss the possibility that the rise
in fatal accident rates reflects better reporting of fatal accidents, but there
may have been other forces at work to cause this rise. Coalemployers cer-
tainly had incentives to enhance safety because the payments they made
to injured miners rose with workers' compensation. Furthermore, both
state compensation funds and private insurance companies eitherin-
spected the mines or reviewed their accident records and rewarded safer
mines with lower premiums.34 Employers responded by adopting safety
measures, like first-aid teams and more safety training, that led tolower
insurance premiums. This heightened emphasis on safety became more
prominent in the operating reports of the Stonega Coke and Coal Com-
pany after the Virginia workers' compensation law was implemented.35
Yet the rise in accident rates under workers' compensation shows that
the employers' increased efforts were either cosmetic or insufficient to re-
solve the moral hazard problems at each miner's workplace. Since coal
loaders and pick miners were paid by the ton of coal they produced, these
workers realized that by working a little faster and taking more risks they
could earn higher incomes. All too often, a roof fall injured or sometimes
killed a miner who tried to finish loading the car before he set new props
for the roof. Under negligence liability, the miner had extra incentive to
work more slowly and safely because if he was injured in a roof fall, he
was likely to get little or no compensation because ofthe employer's con-
tributory negligence defense. Under workers' compensation, however, he
could take more risks to increase his earnings because he was assured in-
jury compensation that was very likely to be higher than what he would have
received under negligence liability.36
The resulting rise in risk-taking led to more accidents like roof falls.
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sections of the mine, were the types of accidents that employers could not
prevent at low cost. Effective prevention required constant attention to
changing natural conditions; therefore the miner could prevent accidents
in his room at much lower cost than the employer could. For the employer
to be as effective at preventing roof falls as the miner, the employer had to
hire large numbers of supervisors to check the rooms constantly. The costs
of hiring supervisors to prevent the extra accidents caused by moral haz-
ard appeared to be higher than the expected cost of paying the workers'
compensation benefits to injured workers. Rather than take these costly
preventive measures, employers chose instead to pay the extra damages in
the form of workers' compensation claims.
The question remains why the results from the coal industry differ from
those that Chelius reported for machinery accidents and Buffum found
for railroads. When workers' compensation was introduced, it appears that
the efforts of manufacturing employers to reduce accident rates more than
offset moral hazard problems. The difference between the industries prob-
ably can be traced to the differences in employers' costs of preventing
accidents. Supervisors could monitor workers' use of machinery more eas-
ily in manufacturing than in coal mining. Instead of tramping long dis-
tances through a mine to visit sixty men in a day, the manufacturing fore-
man could probably meet with sixty men in two hours and still had the
option, unavailable in a mine, of standing on catwalks above the factory
floor and observing overall activity. Further, manufacturing companies
discovered that they could eliminate many machinery accidents by putting
more footguards and handguards near whirring blades and gears. In gen-
eral, both manufacturers and railroads were in a position to reduce acci-
dents by improving the safety of machinery. In contrast, many of the acci-
dents in the miner's room in a coal mine were a result of natural conditions
that the employer could not fix at low cost.
In sum, the introduction of employers' liability laws and workers' com-
pensation led employers to increase their accident prevention efforts and
workers to relax theirs to some extent. The impact on accident rates varied
from industry to industry. Employers' increased prevention efforts appear
to have dominated in manufacturing and on the railroads, where their
costs of accident prevention through changes in machinery and supervi-
sion were relatively low. In contrast, in the coal industry where workers
had always played a much greater role in accident prevention deep within
the mines, accident rates rose. The problems with moral hazard led to the
type of accidents that were very costly for the employer to prevent. There-
fore, employers chose to pay the extra damages to workers instead of in-
curring high monitoring costs. Were coal workers made worse off by this
increase in accident rates? Certainly not. Given that coal workers were
paid piece rates, they relaxed safety precautions only because they were
trading safety for higher earnings. The increased benefits offered by work-82Chapter 3
ers' compensation allowed workers to increase their current earnings by
working faster, while giving them better compensation in case they were
injured.
3.6Summary
The introduction of workers' compensation led to a substantial increase
in the benefits workers could expect to receive on average if they were in-
jured at work. The increase in benefits led to a number of individual-level
and market readjustments. Wages adjusted in response to employer-man-
dated accident benefits and workers modified their choices regarding sav-
ing and purchasing accident insurance. Further, workers' compensation
changed both workers' and employers' incentives to prevent accidents.
Although reformers considered workers' compensation to be a redis-
tribution of income from employers to workers, employers were able to
pass at least some of the costs of the higher benefits back to workers in
the form of wage reductions. Nonunion workers in the coal and lumber
industries "bought" the higher benefits associated with workers' compen-
sation, while unionized workers in the building trades and in the coal in-
dustry were more effective at staving off the wage offsets. If these industries
are representative, then our analysis suggests that the vast majority of
workers who were nonunionized paid for some portion of their increased
postaccident benefits in the form of lower real wages.
Even though some workers paid for workers' compensation, they still
potentially gained from the legislation because they were better insured
against workplace accident risk than before. Under negligence liability
workers tried to insure themselves against accident risk in a variety of
ways, some through purchases of commercial insurance, others through
fraternal societies, still others through employer- or union-based funds.
Typically, the insurance that was available offered relatively meager dis-
ability benefits and did not completely satisfy workers' desires for income
protection against accident risk. Many households therefore accumulated
precautionary savings, which was a relatively expensive means of insuring
against accident risk. The introduction of workers' compensation reduced
the uncertainties of postaccident compensation and raised the level of
postaccident benefits. As a result, many households were able to reduce
their insurance purchases and were able to free that portion of their in-
comes targeted for precautionary saving for other purposes.
Although many reformers and even employers predicted that the intro-
duction of workers' compensation would lead to a decline in accident
rates, the new legal institution gave workers and employers conflicting in-
centives for accident prevention. Increased accident benefits gave employ-
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able to relax their attentiveness to accident prevention because the social
insurance guaranteed their expected incomes. As a result, in settings where
employers could prevent accidents at relatively low cost, accident rates
fell. Where the additional accidents from the workers' relaxed prevention
were costly for employers to prevent, such as in coal mining, accident
rates rose.
In general, the empirical results reported in this chapter suggest that
both employers and workers could have benefited from the introduction
of workers' compensation. Employers in most settings were probably no
worse off because they were able to pass the costs of higher accident bene-
fits back to workers. Workers, even if they bought workers' compensation
through lower wages, were better insured against accident risk, and could
free income used for precautionary saving for other purposes. Even the
rise in accident rates in some industries did not imply that workers were
harmed by workers' compensation. In the industries where accident rates
rose, workers themselves had chosen to relax prevention in order to obtain
higher earnings from working faster, knowing that they were financially
protected in the unlikely event an accident occurred.37
Notes
I. There were many exceptions to this mandate, however. Most states exempted
firms with fewer than five workers. In many states, moreover, agriculture, domestic
service, casual labor, and public service were excluded from the compensation
laws. Sometimes, specific industries were exempted. For example, Maine excluded
logging, Maryland exempted country blacksmiths, and Texas excluded cotton gin-
ning. The laws also precluded compensation in cases where the worker was intoxi-
cated at the time he was injured or if he had maliciously caused his own accident.
For a more comprehensive summary of the exemptions across the United States,
see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1918, 58).
The probabilities we used in the calculations are the probability of an accident
over the course of a year to workers across all industries in Oregon, as reported
in Oregon Industrial Accident Commission (1919). The probabilities were calcu-
lated by taking the number of compensable accidents in each accident class and
dividing by the number of workers covered.
See appendix C for more details on the calculations for Stonega.
Seattle Daily Times, 6 January 1911. The "2 cents" to which the employer
referred was a proposed employer contribution to a first aid fund.
We have focused the analysis on thirteen occupational classes from the forty
specific occupations for which the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported wage
scales by 1923. The occupations chosen reflect a wide and representative character-
ization of the important building trades in the early twentieth century.
These results are based on using real wages as the dependent variable and our
calculations are based on the mean earnings in the sample. When the equations are84Chapter 3
run in semilog form, the wage reductions in response to workers'compensation
are similar: coal at 1.51 percent, lumber at 1.91 percent, and thebuilding trades
at 0.35 percent. See appendix D.
For our purposes here, the expected benefit index is calculated using the na-
tional average wage for each occupation in each year. We did not use the wage
corresponding to each observation because the expected benefits would have been
a function of the wage, thus imparting a positive bias to the estimatedcoefficients
of the expected benefits index. Similarly, we could not use the ratio of expected
benefits to wages because in some cases maximum allowable benefits became bind-
ing and the ratio of expected benefits to wages would have imparted a spurious
negative bias. To eliminate these problems, we used the national average wage for
each occupation in each year, which allowed the expected benefits index to rise in
response to rising wages during the period as well as to reflectdifferences in ex-
pected benefits driven by differences in wages at each skill level. We have also
experimented with using the maximum real expected benefits as allowed by law as
an instrument for the expected benefits for all observations, and the results suggest
a negative and statistically significant wage offset in all cases. We did not focus on
these results because the wages in many occupations were not high enough to
reach the legal maximums.
The concepts of risk-neutrality and risk-aversion are best shown by an ex-
ample. Say an individual faces a choice between two options: Option A pays him
ten dollars for sure, while option B offers him a 50 percent chance ofreceiving
twenty dollars and a 50 percent chance of receiving nothing. A risk-neutralindi-
vidual would be equally satisfied with either option because on average she would
receive ten dollars in option B. A risk-averse person would choose option A, pre-
ferring the certain $10.
Experience rating forces employers to pay higher premiums if there are more
accidents or more severe accidents in their workplaces than the averages on which
the basic premium is based. Insurance companies used experience rating across
industries and states to set the workers' compensation premiums. The National
Council on Workmen's Compensation, the major interstate ratemaker at the time,
typically used the national accident experience in each industry to establish a base
accident rate and then adjusted the rates for each state to reflect the generosity of
benefits there (KuIp 1928, 235-57). Some states were large enough that they could
use their own accident evidence to experience rate, whileinsurance companies
used national averages to determine premiums in states with smaller populations.
Insurance companies and state funds also adjusted premiums for individual firms
based on inspections and some experience rating, but the experience rating at this
level was less accurate than the comparisons across industries (KuIp 1928, 258-96).
Our experiments with lagged (up to three years) expected benefit terms, how-
ever, never showed any signs that the building trades experienced a wageoffset.
II. It is possible that union members' compensation packages adjusted along
other margins that we cannot measure. For instance, the availability of hours, jobs,
working conditions, or other fringe benefits may have responded to higher postac-
cident payments.
12. Numerous theoretical studies show that when faced with uncertain future
income, households may develop a precautionary motive for saving. See, e.g., Le-
land (1968), Sandmo (1970), Cantor (1985), Skinner (1988), Kotlikoff (1989, 141-
51), Zeldes (1989), Kimball (1990), Caballero (1991), Deaton (1991), Carroll
(1992), and Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1994. Skinner (1988) argues that such
precautionary saving may account for as much as 56 percent of total life cycle
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For analyses of the impact of social security on savings, see Feldstein (1974,
1980, 1982), Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995).
In an empirical study of how increases in social insurance affect private insurance
coverage, Cutler and Gruber (1996) find that the expansion of Medicaid coverage
from 1987 to 1992 crowded out the purchasing of private health insurance.
Unfortunately, Whaples and Buffum provided no estimates of the amount
of insurance coverage (even though these data were available), only probability
estimates on whether the workers were insured or not.
See Ransom and Sutch (1989). The Kansas sample is skewed toward skilled
workers and workers in cities far more than the actual distribution of Kansas
workers, as reported in the census occupational statistics.
This estimate is based on answers to the BLS's questions about the value of
insurance. We do not try to use the BLS estimates of the value of insurance further
because there seems to be substantial measurement error in the data. It was not
clear whether the value of the insurance meant the benefit to be paid upon death
or the current cash value of the policy. Further, in the case of accident insurance,
the presence of disability benefits makes the evaluation of the policy's value far
more complicated. The confusion about the values of policies shows up in the
large number of households that offered inconsistent answers to the different ques-
tions about insurance. Of the 6,682 households that claimed to have life insurance
policies, 1,493 households reported a value of zero for their life insurance. Of the
780 households with accident insurance policies, 521 reported a zero value for
their policies. We therefore focus on the question of whether people had insurance
or not.
This statistic was derived from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Mortality
Statistics (1917, 444-45; 1918, 294; 1919, 320; 1920, 296; 1921, 288; 1922, 310).
Because the Census did not report which deaths were caused by workplace acci-
dents, we assumed that all accidental deaths from "absorption of deleterious
gases," "traumatism by cutting or piercing instruments," "traumatism in mines and
quarries," "traumatism by machines," and "railroad accidents and injuries" were
work related. Moreover, because railroad deaths also included passengers, we de-
flated the Mortality Statistics figure by the percentage of passenger deaths as re-
ported by the Interstate Commerce Commission (these data are reported in U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1975, 740). Although our measure of job-related deaths is
very crude, it does suggest that relatively few people died as a result of a work-
place accident.
Payment of benefits, moreover, followed strict guidelines: benefits were paid
provided that the accident did not occur while the insured unnecessarily exposed
himself to "obvious danger" or while he was engaged in an occupation more haz-
ardous than that in which he had elected to be classified and insured. If he was
employed in a more hazardous occupation at the time of injury, then benefits
would be paid according to the insurance his paid premium would have purchased
in the more hazardous class (Hayden's Annual Cyclopedia of Insurance 1913, 3).
Faulkner (1940, 27) reports that the rate of occupational fatal accidents was
45.7 per 100,000 population in 1913 and had fallen to 20.4 by 1938. The death
rate from all accidents was 72.2 per 100,000 population in 1938, but Faulkner did
not report the same statistic for 1913. Thus, in estimating that 63.3 percent of all
fatal accidents occurred on the job, we have assumed that the death rate from all
accidents was the same in 1913 as it was in 1938. This assumption seems reason-
able given that the overall accidental death rate per 100,000 was 69.6 in 1922.
Of the 461 establishment funds surveyed by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor
(1909, 339, 538-53) in 1908, 69.2 percent received no funding at all from employ-86Chapter 3
ers. Eight percent of the funds received more than 50 percent of their funding
from employers. Employers, across the sample, contributed an average of 10.6 per-
cent of the funds' reserves.
See Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) for a theoretical discussion of the use of
family members to poo1 the risk associated with potential income loss.
These factors include household earnings, income from other sources, the
number of children of various ages, the age of the head of the household, his
occupational skill level, the riskiness of his job, possible membership in labor or-
ganizations, differences in the cost of living across cities, and geographic character-
istics.
We have also experimented with other specifications in the saving regression
by adding an interaction term between the accident-rate measure and the
expected-benefits variable. The magnitudes and t-tests of the expected benefits and
accident risk coefficients are similar to the ones reported in appendix table F. I.
This statement holds even in the presence of the wage offsets described ear-
lier (see Fishback 1992, 253-54). We can see this by examining the comparative
statics of the following maximization problem for an employer. The employer
chooses the amount of labor to hire (L) and accident prevention capital to pur-
chase (A) to maximize his profits from production, where profits are
A(L,A) = pQ(L) - rA - w[C,d(A)]L - Cd(A).
The employer sells output (Q) at a price (p) in the product market. For simplicity
assume that output is a function of the amount of labor hired. Costs include the
rental price (r) of safety capital, the wage rage (w[C, d(A)]), postaccident compensa-
tion (C), and accident risk (d(A)). Increases in safety capital lead to reductions in
the accident rate (dA < 0) at a diminishing rate (dAA > 0). Output increases with
increases in labor (QL> 0) at a diminishing rate (QLL < 0). The theory of compen-
sating differentials implies that wages would decrease with increases in post-
accident compensation (w < 0) and would increase with increases in accident
rates (wd> 0). Following standard maximization techniques and deriving the com-
parative statics, it can be shown that the employer will increase his safety capital
when postaccident compensation increases as long as wages do not rise at an in-
creasing rate with increases in accident risk, i.e., Wdd0.
For discussions of this phenomenon, see Viscusi (1992, 84-93, 181-85) and
Fishback (1992, 253).
When workers' compensation was introduced, hardly any workers paid in-
come taxes because under the tax rate structure prior to 1940 less than 10 percent
of households had to pay them. Workers' compensation benefits are exempt from
income taxes. As tax rates have risen, workers' compensation benefits have re-
placed higher and higher percentages of after-tax income. Until the I 970s weekly
maximums on benefits still strongly limited the benefits paid out to workers, but a
nationwide movement to raise the weekly maximums in the I 970s led to the situa-
tion where benefit levels come close to fully replacing after-tax income (see Moore
and Viscusi 1990, 54; Kniesner and Leeth 1991, 67-68).
See Moore and Viscusi (1990, 28-33, 121-35) for a summary.
Lack of accurate definitions of the cause of accidents forced Chelius to use
machinery fatalities in the numerator of his accident measure, which might not be
a good proxy for all types of fatal accidents. A more serious problem exists in the
denominator, which is intended to normalize the number of machinery accidents
by exposure to risk from such accidents. The size of the labor force is not a good
proxy for hours of exposure to dangerous industrial machinery. In the early I 900s,
hours and days worked varied across states and time, as did the mechanization of
work. Chelius tried to control for this in the analysis by taking the ratio of theThe Economic Impact of the Switch to Workers' Compensation87
state death rate to the national death rate, but that does not adequately eliminate
the measurement error problem because the changes in hours and use of machin-
ery in each state were not uniform across the nation. The measurement error in
Chelius's accident rate may be perverse enough that it outweighs the component
of his measure that truly reflects the risk of death by machine.
Chelius tried to control for per capita exposure to machinery, the business
cycle, and technology of medical care by using the ratio of the death rate in each
state to the national death rate for that year as the dependent variable. He also
experimented with various controls for fixed effects.
His control variables included an alternative measure of resources devoted
to safety inspection, employment in mining, employment in railroading, percent
female, percent foreign-born, percent illiterate, percent unionized, percent of
workers in large firms, and measures of relative manufacturing risk.
Buffum (1992, 109-lI, 153-55) also examined the impact of workers' com-
pensation using industrial fatalities reported by various states. In this analysis he
found that workers' compensation led to an increase in fatalities. Buffum noted,
however, that the states had a wide variety of reporting rules, which may have
changed over time. These data were not collected in a consistent manner, as the
mortality statistics were, therefore we believe that much of the increase found in
this data set may be a result of increased reporting.
The data for coal mining have fewer problems with measurement error be-
cause the U.S. Bureau of Mines and U.S. Geological Survey collected statistics
specifically for coal mines, thus all types of accidents in the mines were covered.
Further, the measure of exposure to risk in the denominator is subject to less mea-
surement error because the Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey col-
lected information on hours worked per day, days worked per year, and average
number of workers.
In the text we focus on the results from Fishback (1992). The results in Fish-
back (1987) were very similar, although the control variables differed to some ex-
tent and he used a set of dummies to describe different types of workers' compen-
sation systems. In the 1987 paper the analysis showed that employers' liability
laws were associated with accident rates that were 17 percent higher. Workers'
compensation laws establishing a monopoly state fund were associated with a 23
percent increase in the fatal accident rate, and laws allowing both private and state
insurance were associated with 20 percent higher rates. The impact of workers'
compensation laws with no state funds was smaller and not statistically significant.
The inspections followed schedule ratings that checked the mine against the
"ideal" mine. See Graebner (1976, 149-SI) and Hookstadt (1922, 53).
See Graebner (1976, 151-52) and Stonega Coke and Coal Company, Op-
erating Reports, 191 6-I 925, in Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Del.
Since dead miners received no income, there might not be a moral hazard
problem for fatal accidents. However, the moral hazard problem arose because
miners did not expect each accident to result in death. Roof falls, for example, led
to injuries ranging from bruises to crushed limbs to deaths. Only one in fifty to one
hundred accidents were fatal. Any regression analysis of fatal accidents implicitly
assumes that they are a random sample of all accidents.
This argument does not imply that workers were anticipating full compensa-
tion for injuries. It suggests instead that workers received, on average, higher post-
accident benefits under workers' compensation than under negligence liability, al-
though still less than full compensation. Since the probability of being injured
from marginally relaxing accident prevention was still relatively low, the higher
earnings workers received from taking more risks would more than offset their
expected additional damages from an injury.